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Tuning Up The Copyright Act: Substantial
Similarity And Sound Recording Protections
INTRODUCTION
Sacrificial days devoted to ... creative activities deserve rewards com-
mensurate with the services rendered.1
The Copyright Act of 19762 grants the copyright owner rights
in certain works fixed in a tangible medium.3 In the case of
music, rights attach both to written score 4 and sound record-
ing.5 The Copyright Act affords less protection to sound re-
cordings, however, than to written musical works and other
kinds of copyrighted works. Musical score copyright owners
have the exclusive right to perform and reproduce their work.6
Sound recording copyright.owners hold no corresponding right
of exclusive performance.7 Similarly, sound recording copy-
right holders' exclusive right of reproduction is narrower than
the corresponding right granted to musical score copyright
holders.8
The narrower right of reproduction for sound recording
copyright holders inadequately protects recording artists
against simulations of their work. The Act deems an imitation
of a sound recording to violate the exclusive rights of reproduc-
tion only wthen the imitation directly recaptures the actual
sounds fixed in the sound recording,9 as in mechanical repro-
duction by a duplicating machine. Other recording artists' at-
temnpts to play or sing even a meticulous imitation of the
protected sound recording do not violate the right of reproduc-
1. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Although ownership of a copyright is granted
on fixation of the work in a tangible form, id § 102, the right to obtain judicial
relief for infringement is subject to registration and notice requirements, i
§§ 401-411. The exclusive rights of ownership, listed in § 106, are further re-
stricted by id §§ 107-118.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1982).
5. Id- § 102(a)(7).
6. I § 106(4).
7. See id § 106.
8. Ia § 114.
9. Id. § U4(b).
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tion.10 This absence of protection against nonmechanical imita-
tion allows imitators to profit unfairly from the unique creative
contributions of original recording artists.1 ' The performer
faces the judicial maxim that "imitation alone does not give rise
to a cause of action."' 2
Although the Copyright Act offers no protection against
close imitations, some courts have responded to performers' de-
mands by extending the protection of tort law.'3 This Note ar-
gues that these state law causes of action do not adequately
protect recording artists, and suggests that Congress amend the
Copyright Act to provide protection against substantially simi-
lar imitations of a copyrighted sound recording. Part I of the
Note reviews copyright law and other legal doctrines that pro-
tect recording artists. Part II explains the inadequacies of these
protections as they pertain to sound recordings. Part III con-
cludes that amending the Copyright Act to protect against
sound recording imitations is the best solution to the weak pro-
tection afforded by elusive and inconsistent state and common-
law doctrines.
L STATE AND FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR
RECORDING ARTISTS
A. THE POLICY EMBODIED BY COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright, an intangible form of property, grants the
owner exclusive control over the literary, musical, graphic, or
artistic expression of an idea.14 Congressional authority over
copyright originates with article I of the United States Consti-
10. See id.
11. See infra notes 35-79 and accompanying text; see also Fantastic Fakes,
Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that plain-
tiff who engaged in production of "soundalikes," rerecordings by different art-
ists of previously released sound recordings, could not prevail over worldwide
record distributor on breach of licensing agreement); Note, Performer's
Style--A Quest for Ascertainmen4 Recognition, and Protection, 52 DEN. L.J.
561, 562-66 (1975) (discussing cases in which performer's "style' was appropri-
ated deliberately and used without disclosure of performance's origin to pub-
lic). For a recent example of purposeful imitation for commercial purposes,
see Midler v. Ford, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), a case in which an, advertising
agency deliberately sought out and used a singer to imitate Bette MAidler's
voice for a nationwide advertising campaign.
12. See Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal.
1969).
13. See infra notes 35-79 and accompanying text.
14. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REvISION
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (House Comm. Print 1961)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE REGISTER].
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tution, empowering Congress ".... [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Airts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."'15 This limited monopoly encourages
the creation of intellectual property that enriches society, while
taking into account the authors' need for incentive and remu-
neration for their creative works.' 6
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. REPORT OF THE REGISTER, supra note 14, at 5. While preparing the
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress stated-
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms
of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the au-
thor has in his writings ... but upon the ground that the welfare of
the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will
be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive
rights to their writings ....
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . how
much will the legislation stimulate the producer... [and] how much
will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?
I& (quoting H.R. REP. Nor 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909)).
Copyright law balances competing goals. Congress's grant of exclusivity to
an artist limits public access to the artist's work, while the copyright statute
limits the artist's rights to control a work of intellectual property. The law's
balance of artist's rights against public benefit has fluctuated with time. Since
the enactment of the 1909 statute, authors' rights have taken on greater impor-
tance, demonstrated by subsequent expanded copyright protection for the art-
ist. Marke, United States Coznjright Revision and its Legislative History, 70
LAW LIBR. J. 121, 122 (1977).
The first Congress, borrowing heavily from England's Statute of Anne,
1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19, enacted a copyright law entitled "An Act for the Encour-
agement of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts and Books to
the Authors and Proprietors of Such Copies, during the Times Therein Men-
tioned." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 1-7, 1 Stat. 124. Later amendments ex-
tended copyright protection to prints, Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171;
musical compositions, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-16, 4 Stat. 436; public
performances of dramatic works, Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138; and
fine art, Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 100, 16 Stat. 198.
Congress enacted a general revision of copyright law in 1909. Act of Mar.
4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1075. For a thorough discus-
sion of the legislative history of this enactment, see E. BRYLAWSKI & A.
GOLDmIAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT (1976). In addi-
tion to incorporating earlier amendments, the 1909 law extended the duration
of protection and added unpublished works to its scope. Marke, supra, at 124.
The inadequacies of the 1909 Act's protections became apparent in light of new
technologies such as the phonograph, however, prompting Congress to con-
sider revisions. A congressional report noted that the advent of sound record-
ings, motion pictures, and even laser technology had generated "new
industries and new methods for the reproduction and dissemination of copy-
righted works." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, re7rinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5660. Ensuing debate focused on,
among other things, the copyrightability of sound recordings, and resulted in
the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L.
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B. PROTECTIONS FOR MUSICAL WORKS
The Copyright Act of 1976 attaches certain proprietary
rights to works fixed in a tangible medium. The Act treats
written music, such as sheet music or a written score, sepa-
rately from sound recording.11 A "sound recording" is defined
as a work fixed onto a "phonorecord."'I Thus, the sound re-
cording is only the recorded performance, and the phonorecord
is the material object-disk, tape, or album-onto which the
sound recording becomes fixed. A "musical work," on the
other hand, encompasses the written composition and accompa-
nying lyrics.' 9
The holder of a written musical work copyright possesses
the exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 of the Act: the
rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, and prepare derivative
works from the protected work.20 Section 114 of the Act, how-
ever, limits the section 10621 rights available to holders of sound
recording copyright. The owner's exclusive right to reproduc-
tion includes only the right to duplicate the sound recording by
directly recapturing the actual sounds fixed in the recording.22
This limitation leaves the owner unprotected against other
No. 92-140, 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADNMN. NEWS (85 Stat.) 391 (current ver-
sion at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (1982)).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
18. Id. § 101. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a sound recording as the
fixation of a series of sounds, other than the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other visual work. Id. The Act definesfixation as sound put into a
"tangible medium of expression" that can be "perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration," such as the
sound embodied in a phonorecord. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1982).
20. Id, § 106.
21. Id § 114, entitled "Scope of Exclusive Rights in sound recordings,"
provides in relevant part-
(b) The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate
the sound recording in the form of phonorecords ... that directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The ex-
clusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative
work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are re-
arranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The
exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or du-
lplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an in-
dependent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate
or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.
Id. (emphasis added).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1982).
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sound recordings that consist of independently fixed sounds,
even those that imitate or simulate the copyrighted sound
recording.23
Section 114 thus prohibits mechanical duplication of a re-
cording, such as making a cassette duplication of a record. The
section also prohibits making a derivative work24 in which the
actual sounds in a protected recording are rearranged, remixed,
or otherwise altered in sequence or quality, such as by electron-
ically lifting a passage off another artist's record and incorpo-
rating it into a separate work.25 Section 114 does not, however,
prohibit a music producer from hiring musicians and vocalists
to record the closest possible imitation of another artist's sound
recording, so long as the new production does not mechanically
reproduce the original recording's actual sound.26 Such an ef-
fort at human-as opposed to mechanical-reproduction of a
sound recording constitutes an "independent fixation" allowed
by section 114.27 Such a producer would have to buy a license
in the underlying musical composition, but the Act compels the
owner to sell that license for a set fee.28
This rule that only an actual reproduction 9 of a sound re-
cording violates the exclusive right of reproduction departs
23. 1& § 114(b).
24. Id. §§ 106(2), 114(a). Derivative work is defined as a work "based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a... musical arrangement,...
sound recording,... or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted." Id § 101.
To claim copyright protection independent of the composition on which it
is based, a derivative sound recording must contain some originality. 1 M. NIM-
MER & D. NMER, NimMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A][2], at 2-143 (1988). Origi-
nality in a sound recording may proceed from the performer's unique
contribution, the record producer's involvement, or both. H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5659, 5669; see also H. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1971
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1566, 1570 (copyrightable elements of sound
recording usually include authorship by performer and producer).
25. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 434, 264
N.E.2d 874, 877 (1970) (finding that defendant had merely dubbed and sold
copies of plaintiff's recording, thus actually appropriating plaintiff's product).
26. Not only may another group of musicians and vocalists attempt to imi-
tate the sound recording as closely as possible, they also may mimic the per-
former's individually created style of publicly presenting that copyrighted
sound recording.
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
28. See id. § 115 (delineating guidelines and regulations for purchase of
compulsory licenses in sound recordings).
29. As used in this Note, actual reproduction means the mechanical re-
production of a previous sound recording that generates a "copy" of the origi-
nal recording.
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markedly from the rules protecting against reproduction of
other kinds of artistic works under section 106.3 ) In the case of
literary, dramatic, choreographic, audiovisual, and other musi-
cal works,3 1 a "substantial similarity" test applies to potentially
infringing reproductions and simulations.32 For example, a dra-
matic work in which sequences of events and character devel-
opments are substantially similar to those in a copyrighted
work violates the copyright owner's exclusive right of repro-
duction if a plaintiff can show that the defendant had access to
the copyrighted work.3 3 Expert testimony helps guide jury de-
terminations of substantial similarity.34
The use of an "actual reproduction" test instead of the
usual "substantial similarity" test for the infringement of sound
recording suggests that all originality in a musical work lies in
its written score. A musical producer who has purchased a li-
cense in a written score may record whatever rendition he
30. Other types of works covered by copyright law are more stringently
protected. "[Dlepartures or variations from the copyrighted work would still
be an infringement as long as the author's expression rather than merely the
author's 'ideas' are taken. An exception to this general principle, applicable to
the reproduction of copyrighted sound recordings, is specified in section 114."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmin. NEws 5659, 5675.
31. A musical work-the composition itself-does not include the sound
recording under § 102. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
32. See, eg., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 977-80 (2d
Cir.) (assessing substantial similarity of book to determine infringement), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDon-
ald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that infringement may
be shown by "circumstantial evidence of access to the copyrighted work and
substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and defendant's work");
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that substantial
similarity, together with evidence of access, makes out prima facie case of in-
fringement in absence of defendant's admission of copying); Nichols v. Univer-
sal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121-23 (2d Cir. 1930) (discussing copyright
protection of plaintiff's play against play that used same underlying abstract
plot), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
33. Compare Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121-22 (determining that one play cannot
infringe copyright of another merely by using same theme and similar stock
characters, despite substantial similarity) with Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-56 (2d Cir.) (holding film infringed play to which
film makers had access, and film bore striking similarity), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936).
34. Arnstein-v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), introduced the classic,
two-tiered approach to determining substantial similarity. Expert testimony is
admitted to dissect and analyze the similarities of the two works at issue. If
the expert establishes copying, the jury determines whether the copying rises
to the level of unlawful infringement, generally applying "lay listeners" stan-
dard. Id. at 473.
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likes, including a note-for-note, identically phrased imitation of
another artist's rendition. The result suggests that any one re-
cording artist's rendition of a musical work is not a unique crea-
tive contribution worthy of copyright protection. Because this
suggestion seems unfair to recording artists, many state courts
have used state law doctrines to protect a recording artist's ren-
dition of a musical work in a sound recording. These doctrines
include unfair competition, misappropriation, and the right of
publicity.
C. UNFAIR COMPETITION
The common-law doctrine of unfair competition35 prevents
one producer from deceiving the public into thinking that its
goods are those of another. This deception, known as "passing
off,"2 6 gives rise to a claim of unfair competition only if the two
producers are in competition.37 The ultimate potential for de-
ception, rather than the second producer's intent to deceive,
governs findings of unfair competition.38 The law of unfair
competition thus may bar the simulation of sound recordings3 9
when the simulation deceives the audience into identifying the
35. Because this doctrine eludes precise definition, Congress and several
states have supplemented the common law with statutes. 1 R. CALLMANN,
THE LAW OF UNFAIR CoMPETITIoN, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 2.09 (L.
Altman rev. 4th ed. 1981). Such statutes regulate unfair methods of competi-
tion, false advertising, and deceptive trade practices. Id Most of this statutory
supplementation of common-law unfair competition occurred after a 1958
American Bar Association study concluded that state unfair competition laws
were either inadequate or ambiguous and archaic. Id. § 2.09, at 34. (citing
Lundsford, Uifair Competition, 1958 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARIC COPY-
RIGHT L. REP. 79; see also THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION,
STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR CoMPETrrION LAw (1988) (listing each state's
related statutory and common-law authority).
36. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 1015 (W. Kee-
ton 5th ed. 1984). Passing off "deceivets] the ordinary consumer acting with
the caution usually exercised in such transactions, so that he may mistake one
for the other." Id- § 130, at 1016.
37. 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 35, § 2.09.
38. Id.
39. Relevant unfair competition cases include Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1970) (alleging unfair competition by
defendant's imitation of plaintiff's musical hit and visual performance charac-
teristics), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d
256, 257 (1st Cir. 1962) (involving imitation of plaintiff's unique vocal delivery
as comic character); Booth v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 344-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (involving imitation of television character's vocal sound);
Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 359-61, 269.P. 544, 545 (1928) (alleging
imitation of plaintiff's vocal delivery as comic character).
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replication as the original.40
A recording artist used unfair competition law to attack a
producer who made a substantially similar sound recording of
the plaintiff's work in Shaw v. Time-Life Records.41 Plaintiff
Artie Shaw, a prominent jazz artist of the 1940s, claimed that
Time-Life's "Swing Era" recordings unfairly competed with his
actual recordings. The recordings simulated Shaw's work and
were labeled as "Artie Shaw" versions. The court held that the
recordings' potential for consumer deception supported a denial
of the defendant's motion for summary judgment in Shaw's un-
fair competition claim.4 3
Federal unfair competition law44 also has restricted sub-
stantially similar reproductions of a sound recording when de-
ception was possible. In In re Magnetic Video Corp.,4 5 the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") brought an action against
Magnetic Video Corporation for marketing "sound-alike" re-
cordings of popular songs. 46 For example, the defendant la-
beled its phonorecords as "The Sounds of Neil Diamond," and
"Grammy Hits of 1973."47 The FTC found that Magnetic's pro-
40. See Note, supra note 11, at 582 (suggesting unfair competition doctrine
applies to actions for deceptive imitation of general performance style).
The plaintiff prevailed under a typical common-law unfair competition
analysis in Lahr, 300 F.2d at 256. Adell Chemical produced a radio commercial
using an actor who specialized in imitating the plaintiff's vocal sound. Id at
257. The plaintiff, Bert Lahr, is best known to audiences for his portrayal of
the Cowardly Lion in the 1939 film The Wizard of Oz. The First Circuit held
that the trial court's dismissal of the action was incorrect; because the imita-
tion would lead audiences to believe that Lahr's voice was used and may have
saturated plaintiff's market, the commercial could have constituted unfair
competition. Id at 259.
41. 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975).
42. la at 203, 341 N.E.2d at 818, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
43. IHL at 207, 341 N.E.2d at 819, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 394. The court stated,
however, that Shaw had no "property interest in the Artie Shaw 'sound."' Id.
at 205, 341 N.E.2d at 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). The Federal Trade Commission Act
('F.T.C.A.") added the concept of "unfair methods of competition" to the com-
mon-law cause of action of unfair competition, which often required only
"passing off" and actual direct market competition. See 1 IL CALL12ANN, supra
note 35, § 2.08. Section five of the F.T.C.A. primarily addresses misleading ad-
vertising and antitrust actions, providing that "unfair methods of competition
in commerce are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
45. 86 F.T.C. 1515 (1975).
46. I& at 1516. The FTC alleged that Magnetic Video Corporation had vi-
olated section five of the F.T.C.A. Id at 1519.
47. 1& at 1517. The FTC complaint alleged that Magnetic's record packag-
ing bore likenesses of the original artist or depictions similar to those accom-
panying the original releases. a
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motional and labeling practices may have deceived the public
into believing that its products were original artists' record-
ings,48 and ordered "clear and conspicuous disclosure" in all
Magnetic's future dealings. 49 Although the case turned on fed-
eral rather than state unfair competition law, it resulted in the
protection of a sound recording against a substantially similar
reproduction.
Not all courts have been willing to supplement the Copy-
right Act's protection of sound recordings with unfair competi-
tion law. In Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,50 the
Ninth Circuit found that the copyright law preempted unfair
competition law as applied to sound recordings. In Sinatra,
Goodyear obtained a license to use a song popularized by Nancy
Sinatra, "These Boots are Made for Walkin'," for a "Wide
Boots" tire commercial. 51 Goodyear deliberately selected a
singer for her ability to imitate Sinatra's voice, and when mov-
ing for summary judgment, "candidly admitted... that the vo-
cal rendition was an imitation of plaintiff's recorded
performance."5 2 Sinatra alleged that although the defendant
bought a license to use her song, its imitation of her perform-
ance constituted consumer deception.53 The court denied Sina-
tra relief on the grounds that no actual competition existed
between Sinatra and Goodyear 4 and that the Copyright Act
preempted Sinatra's claim. The court explained that protecting
Sinatra's renditions conflicted with Congress's affirmative de-
48. Id. at 1519.
49. Ad at 1520. The court ordered that the company include the bold face
legend "THIS IS NOT AN ORIGINAL ARTIST RECORDING" on tape and
record products, and specified other mandatory disclosure practices, such as
oral disclosure on all radio and television promotions. rd. at 1520-22.
50. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
51. Goodyear gained its license to use the song in compliance with the
Copyright Act, thereby precluding a cause of action under federal copyright
law. Id- at 713 & n.2. The court noted that beyond the licensing provisions,
nothing in the Copyright Act of 1909 grants "a performer's right, per se." Id.
at 714 (footnote omitted).
52. Id at 713.
53. Id at 712. Sinatra also alleged that her unique performance was inti-
mately associated with the song and gave it "secondary meaning." Id Secon-
dary meaning often arises as an issue in unfair competition cases, and refers to
an association in the minds of members of the public that links an individual
product with a certain source. See BLACK'S LAw DiCrIoNARY 1212-13 (5th ed.
1979). Prosser defines as secondary meaning that which attaches to a name or
design when it is used in such a way that the public identifies products bearing
the name or design with the plaintiff. W. PnossER, suira note 36, § 130, at
1017. The issue of secondary meaning lies outside the scope of this Note.
54. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716.
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nial of protection for performance rights in a sound recording.55
D. MISAPPROPRIATION
A cause of action for misappropriation resembles an unfair
competition action in that it involves imitation. A misappropri-
ation plaintiff, however, need not satisfy unfair competition's
requirements of "passing off" and market competition between
the parties.5 6 The basic elements of misappropriation are: (1)
the plaintiff invested substantial time, effort, and money creat-
ing a product; (2) the defendant wrongfully appropriated the
creation, "reaping where it has not sown;" and (3) defendant in-
jured plaintiff by the misappropriation 5 7 The essence of the
55. The court wrote that "to allow unfair competition protection where
Congress has not given federal protection is in effect granting state copyright
benefits without the federal limitations." 1d, at 718.
Much discussion has focused on whether federal copyright law preempts
any state protection for performance style. Early Supreme Court rulings in
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Ina, 376 U.S. 234 (1964), and Sears Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), established that works unpro-
tected by federal patent law were also ineligible for state-law protection.
Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38; Sears Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 232. The Supreme
Court later reinterpreted the preemption rulings and held that state-law may
control where no concurrent or conflicting federal law exists. See Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479-80, 492-93 (1974) (holding state trade
secrets law valid where no conflicting federal law existed); Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546, 561-70 (1973) (upholding state law action against sound re-
cording piracy).
The Copyright Act of 1976 deals specifically with preemption, stating:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of au-
thorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1982). For discussions of the preemption issue, see Abrams,
Copyrigh4 Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory
Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 509, 515-37 (addressing ju-
dicial decisions on preemption in general and their effect on copyright law);
Note, The Right of Publicity as a Means of Protecting Performers' Style, 14
LOYOLA L.A.L. REv. 129, 149-51 (1980) (reviewing Supreme Court decisions
and concluding that right of publicity avoids any preemption problems).
56. See Note, A Cause of Action for Simulation of Sound Recordings?
Yes!: Reflections on the 1976 Copyright Act, 30 RuTGERs L. REV. 139, 145
(1985); see also Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
199 Misc. 786, 791, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951).
57. 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEmARKs AND UNFAm COmPETnON § 10:25 (2d
ed. 1984). Courts have relied on the doctrine of misappropriation as ancillary
to the law of copyright and unfair competition since the doctrine's appearance
in 1918. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
see generally 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 35, §§ 4.63, 15.01-.02 (summarizing
1184 [Vol. 73:3175
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cause of action lies in the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
product, into which the plaintiff invested time, skill, and
money.58
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,59 the Ninth Circuit recently
controversy over and commenting on misappropriation); Baird, Common Law
Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press, 50 U. Clu. L. REV. 411, 412-23 (1983) (discussing probable impact
and potential snags with holding of title case); Fetter, Copyright Revision and
the Preemption of State "Misappropriation" Law: A Study in Judicial and
Congressional Interaction, 27 COPYRiGHT L. SYmp. (ASCAP) 1, 19-33 (1982)
(discussing recently emerging difficulties with preemption doctrine and debate
over impact of copyright revision on law of misappropriation and preemption);
Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107, 1121 (1977)
(noting judiciary's distinction between copying and misappropriation and sug-
gesting that misappropriation claims are not preempted); Comment, The Mis-
appropriation Doctrine After the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L.
REv. 469, 493 (1977) (arguing that copyright revision of 1976 clearly defined
boundaries of misappropriation law, permitting doctrine to apply to competi-
tive situation so long as its protection is not equivalent to that provided by
Copyright Act).
58. See Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis.
2d 163, 175, 218 N.W.2d 705, 710 (1974), cert denied, appeal dismissed, 420 U.S.
914 (1975). Another decision involved the alleged misappropriation of a race
car driver's name, likeness, and personality. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822 (9th Cir. 1974). Motschenbacher, an inter-
nationally-known driver, customized his car over a period of years. The
defendants produced a television commercial featuring the car. Id. at 822. In
reversing a summary judgment for the defendants, the court stated that
"where the identity appropriated has a commercial value, the injury may be
... economic." Id- at 824. Regardless of the nature of the injury, however, the
issue of whether the defendants wrongfully appropriated Motschenbacher's
"uniquely distinguishing features" was a question to be answered on remand.
Id at 827.
In finding a defendant liable for misappropriation, one court stated that
the defendant "not merely copied or imitated discs or tapes produced ...
rather (defendant] has appropriated the product itself-performances embod-
ied on the records." Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 538,
82 Cal. Rptr. 798, 806 (1969); cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Melody
Recordings, Inc., 134 N.J. Super. 368, 382, 341 A.2d 348, 355 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975) (upholding judgment of unfair competition against defendant who
merely recorded plaintiff's original musical performance and sold it).
Nimmer questioned the practical significance of differentiating reproduc-
tion and misappropriation. "It is true that in the case of record piracy such
reproduction is accomplished by mechanical means rather than via the human
hand or ear, but why is that significant? Could any greater state law liability
attach to the photographic reproduction of a Rembrandt... than would be
true in the case of free hand copying?" 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note
24, § 1.01[13], at 1-20.5. Nimmer concluded that misappropriation in the sound
recording context merely-proscribes nonmechanical reproduction, and thus is
preempted by the Copyright Act. Id § 1.01[B], at 1-20.5 to 1-20.6.
59. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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invoked misappropriation law in reversing summary judgment
against a recording artist who claimed that an advertising
agency wrongfully appropriated her song by using a "sound-
alike" singer to record an imitation.60 After singer Bette Mfid-
ler rejected Ford's offer to sing her 1973 hit "Do You Want to
Dance?" for a Ford commercial, Ford sought and hired one of
Midler's former backup singers to imitate Mfidler's rendition.6 1
In reviewing the scope of protection available to Mfidler, the
court emphasized that voices are not entitled to copyright pro-
tection.62 The court nevertheless noted that California law al-
lowed recovery in tort for the appropriation of one's identity,
and concluded that imitation of a person's voice violates a per-
sonal property right.63 The court thus held that Mfidler made a
prima facie showing that the defendants unlawfully appropri-
60. IH at 463.
61. Id. at 461. Copyright infringement was not an issue, because Ford had
obtained a license to use the song itself. Id at 462. The agreement of a
number of people that the recording "sounded just exactly" like Midler's rec-
ord demonstrated that the imitation was highly successful. Id. at 461-62. The
court first addressed the preemption issue, citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982), for
the proposition that imitation of a sound recording, regardless of quality or in-
tent, avoids federal copyright liability for reproduction. Midler, 849 F.2d at
462.
The court then discussed the first amendment's role in determining
whether a sound recording is protected from an infringement by replication.
Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. The court wrote: "If the purpose [of the original re-
cording] is 'informative or cultural' the use [by replication] is immune [from
suit]; 'if it serves no such function but merely exploits the individual por-
trayed, immunity will not be granted."' Id. (citing Felcher & Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 Yale L.J. 1577,
1596 (1979)).
The Midler case's primary significance perhaps lies in its departure from
the common-law tendency to deny that a performer has rights in a sound re-
cording. See, eg., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716-18(9th Cir. 1970) (denying performer relief due to lack of secondary meaning and
direct competition), cert; denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying performer relief
in part because imitation does not constitute unfair competition and defendant
did not infringe plaintiff's appearance or personality); Davis v. Trans World
Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (denying performer relief due
to lack of showing of passing off or deception).
62. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. Copyright attaches to "original works of au-
thorship, fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982). The court reasoned that vocal sounds lack fixation for purposes of
copyright. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. Because copyright relief was unavailable,
the court narrowly framed the issue as only the protection of Mlidler's voice.
Id
63. In the words of the Ninth Circuit, "The singer manifests herself in the
song. To impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity." Midler, 849 F.2d at
464.
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ated her identity for commercial gain.6
E. THE RIGHT OF PuBLIcITY
The newest player in the performer protection game is the
"right of publicity."65 The doctrine provides individuals with
exclusive rights in their own names, likenesses, or personal
characteristics. 66 Unauthorized portrayals of these characteris-
tics for commercial gain violate this right.6 7 Because state stat-
utes or common law govern the publicity right, substantial
variation in the level and scope of protection occurs among ju-
risdictions. 6 8 A New York statute, for example, limits protec-
64. Id. at 463. The court narrowed its holding, however, by stating that it
"need not' hold that every imitation for advertising purposes gives rise to tor-
tious liability. Id The court did not explain this restriction, which creates un-
certainty as to the scope and precedential value of the holding.
65. Judge Frank coined the phrase in his famous opinion in Haelen Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
66. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 61, at 1589. Many individuals asserting
this right are performers who claim they have been denied the benefits pro-
duced by unauthorized publicity. Id at 1588; see, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977) (agreeing that in media
portrayals, right of publicity is a person's "control over commercial display and
exploitation of his personality and exercising of his talents."); Topps, 202 F.2d
at 867 (coining phrase "right of publicity" to allow baseball players exclusive
rights to use of their photographs).
Felcher and Rubin imply that copyright law may protect simulations of a
performer's work when the simulations are "verbatim presentations" of the
performances. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 61, at 1578 n.11. Broader protec-
tion against the unauthorized use of a performer's name, likeness, characteris-
tics, and life history, however, may exceed "the constitutional limits of the
copyright clause." Id.; see also 1 M. NzIoER & D. NMMER, supra note 24,
§ 1.08[C] (Congress extended copyright protection to work that has not become
writing, concept that may be held unconstitutional).
67. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 61, at 1589. The courts do not approach
the right of publicity consistently, however, because no universally recognized
test of the scope of this right exists. Id at 1590.
68. One major difference among state laws concerns the descendibility of
the right of publicity. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616
F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1980) (ruling that right of publicity does not descend
under Tennessee law); see also Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the
Right of Publicity: Is there Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125,
1127-32 (1980) (drawing analogy between right of publicity and rights of pri-
vacy, defamation, property, and copyright to determine proper scope of right).
California recognizes a common-law right of publicity. Elements of a
claim for appropriation of the right of publicity include the defendant's use of
plaintiff's identity, the defendant's appropriation of the plaintiff's name or
likeness, the plaintiff's lack of consent, and resulting injury. THE UNITED
STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION LAW at CA-17 (1988); see, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App.
3d 409, 419-21, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348-49 (1983) (applying elements of appropri-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion to a person's "name, portrait or picture. '6 9 In contrast, a
California statute prohibits only unauthorized use of another's
actual voice for advertising purposes.7 0
Although no court has applied right of publicity doctrine to
protect against the substantially similar reproduction of a
sound recording, courts have invoked the doctrine in other re-
lated contexts to prevent simulation of a performer's style. In
Estate of Presley v. Russen,71 the court enjoined an Elvis Pres-
ley imitator's stage performance entitled "The Big El Show."72
The court reasoned that the show exploited Elvis Presley for
commercial gain, without contributing artistic or educational
value to society.73
ation of right of publicity). But cf. UTlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp..1277,
1280 (D. Minn. 1970) (separating actions for invasion of privacy from actions
for misappropriation of personal property right, such as name, likeness, or
personality).
69. N.Y. Crv. RTS. LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989) (providing
cause of action for use of another's name, portrait, or picture for advertising
purposes); see also MASS. GEN. L. ch. 214 § 3A (1986) (prohibiting unauthorized
use of another's name, portrait, or picture for advertising or trade purposes);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984) (prohibiting unauthorized use of another's
name or picture). But cf. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc.
2d 603, 609, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (commenting that statute's
lack of voice protection may be result of oversight, because possibility of repro-
ducing and disseminating vocal sound was not contemplated when §§ 50 and 51
of New York Civil Rights Law were enacted).
70. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1989) (providing for damages
to person injured by another's use of person's voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness).
71. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
72. IM at 1382-83.
73. Ida at 1359. This policy-based analysis parallels the "fair use" doctrine
of copyright by allowing reproduction for comment and education-uses
deemed valuable to the public. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). As codified, the doc-
trine states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [granting exclusive
rights to copyright owners], the fair use of a copyrighted work, includ-
ing such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as driticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be consid-
ered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
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The right of publicity doctrine also protected "Mr. New
Year's Eve," Guy Lombardo, in a suit involving television ad-
vertising.74 In Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,75 the
defendant's television commercial featured a New Year's Eve
party, including a band leader who looked and acted like
Lombardo and who conducted music popularized by
Lombardo.7 6 The court held that a celebrity has a proprietary
interest in his public persona and may protect it from exploita-
tion.77 The court also held that if the commercial exploited
Lombardo's personal style, Lombardo had a claim for public de-
ception.78 Based on cases such as Presley and Lombardo, re-
cording artists could argue that they have the right to exclusive
Id.
74. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396
N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977). The defendant appealed the lower court's de-
nial of its motion to dismiss Lombardo's claims for invasion of privacy and in-
vasion of public personality. Id- at 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 663. Thus, the court
assumed the truth of Lombardo's assertions in reversing the lower court on
the first action and affirming it on the second. Id.
75. Id, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661.
76. Id at 622-23, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
77. I& at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
78. Id at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65. The court, however, dismissed
Lombardo's claim based on N.Y. CIv. RTs. §§ 50-51 (MCKINNEY 1976), which
allows individuals to enjoin and sue for damages any person using the individ-
ual's "name, portrait, or picture" without consent. The court construed the
statute narrowly, holding that name meant full name and that picture did not
prohibit "the portrayal of an individual's personality or style." Id., 396
N.Y.S.2d at 664-65. The concurrence disagreed, citing Binns v. Vitograph Co.,
210 N.Y. 51, 57, 103 N.E. 1108, 1110 (1913).
A picture within the meaning of the statute is not necessarily a photo-
graph of a living person, but includes any representation of such per-
son .... The defendant is in no position to say that the picture does
not represent the plaintiff or that it was an actual picture of a person
made up to look like and impersonate the plaintiff.
Id. at 623, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665-66 (Hopkins, J.P., Margett & Shapiro, JJ., con-
curring) (quoting Binns, 210 N.Y. at 57, 103 N.E. at 1110).
Despite the existence of Lombardo and previous judicial formulations of
the right of publicity, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that no
common-law right of publicity existed in New York. In Stephano v. News
Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220
(1984), the court ruled that New York's statute prohibiting unauthorized use
of a person's likeness for advertising preempted any common-law right of pub-
licity. Id- at 183, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224. The holding contra-
dicted a string of decisions since the doctrine's introduction in Haelen
Laboratories, Inc, v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), and apparently overruled Lombardo. The
court expressly refused to consider, however, whether the statute also con-
trolled assignment, transfer, or descent of publicity rights. Evidence of
Stephano's potential long-term effect on decisions regarding the appropriation
of identity for commercial purposes has yet to arise. See Halpern, The Right of
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use of their singing voices or instrumental talents and that un-
authorized portrayal of their singing or playing wrongfully in-
trudes on their exclusive right to publicize the identifying
elements of their performing styles.
By applying these doctrines to protect recording artists
against close imitations of their work, courts recognize that re-
cording artists make a unique and valuable contribution to a
song through their rendition of it. The vocal styles of Nancy Si-
natra and Bette Midler, for example, made their songs attrac-
tive to the public. The advertising. companies' attempts to hire
not merely well-trained singers with good voices, but singers
who could imitate the famous renditions, demonstrated the
value of these performers' particular styles.
Musicians, as well as singers, contribute valuable elements
of style to sound recordings. In an age of electronic and impro-
visational music, musicians regularly develop and popularize
new "sounds." Other musicians easily profit by simulating
these unique and popular sounds.79
II. FLAWS IN STATE LAW DOCTRINES AND THE
NEEDED EXPANSION IN COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR RECORDING
ARTISTS
Recording artists have resorted to a variety of state-law
doctrines to find a cause of action against substantially similar
Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality,
39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1212 (1986).
79. Digital sound sampling, for instance, has reduced sound imitation to
an exact science. The technique involves recording a sound and breaking
down its sound waves into binary digital numbers read by computer. Once
stored in the computer, the tone can be altered electronically. Note, Digital
Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic
Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUm. L. REV. 1723, 1724-25 (1987). Because the
tonal qualities of a voice or instrument then can be manipulated to do virtually
anything, imitators can create an entire song using a single "sample." Id.
Thus, a sample of Luciano Pavarotti's voice could be used to create a recording
of Pavarotti apparently "singing" a song, when, in fact, a computer keyboard
produced the entire recording.
Courts have not yet addressed digital sound sampling. Some question ex-
ists whether the process would be considered "dubbing," and therefore subject
to § 114 of the Copyright Act, or "independent fixation," permitted by the Act.
See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982) (governing copyright protection for sound record-
ings). One commentator contends that the concepts of dubbing and substantial
similarity may be interpreted to protect copyright holders from digitally-cre-
ated reproductions of their existing sound recordings. See Note, supra, at 1745.
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reproductions of their sound recordings, 0 because the Copy-
right Act expressly allows independent fixations that simulate
but do not actually reproduce a copyrighted sound recording.8 1
Although state courts grant relief in some cases, jurisdictions
differ -widely in the elements they require to establish a cause
of action under each doctrine, in the scope of protection that
each doctrine affords, and even over the validity of the doc-
trines themselves.
Variations in the right of publicity doctrine illustrate the
inconsistencies among the states. Many states allow relief only
from the appropriation of a person's name or likeness.8 2 These
states thus exclude relief from appropriation of a musical per-
formance. Other states extend the right of publicity to a per-
son's "distinguishing characteristic,"83a and the courts of these
states might consider a singing style to be a distinguishing char-
acteristic. Still other jurisdictions ignore the right of publicity
completely 8 4 The application of the unfair competition and
misappropriation doctrines also. varies from state to state.8 5
80. See supra notes 35-78 and accompanying text.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
82. See, ag., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417, 198
Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983) (listing California's right of publicity elements as in-
cluding appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage);
Stephano v. News Group Publicitions, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 485 N.Y.S.2d
220, 224, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (1984) (holding no common-law right of publicity
exists in New York); N.Y. CIv. RTS. §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976) (protecting
against unauthorized uses of living person's name, portrait, or picture for ad-
vertising purposes).
83, See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970).
84. See, e.g., THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, STATE
TRADE ARK AND UNFAIR CoMPETITIoN LAW (Illinois state section) (1988)
(noting that although no Illinois court has yet considered right of publicity,
state courts have recognized cause of action for unauthorized appropriation
of another's name or likeness under privacy doctrine); see also supra notes
35-64 and accompanying text (discussing unfair competition law and
misappropriation).
85. Both the unfair competition and misappropriation doctrines vary
among jurisdictions. For a comprehensive discussion of each of the 50 states'
unfair competition laws, see THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK AsSOCIATION,
STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw (1988).
The doctrines also vary depending on whether protection is sought under
statute or common law. See generally TnE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSO-
CIATION, STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPEnTION LAW (1988) (cataloging
all 50 states' protections available under both statute and common law). Many
states have codified the common-law cause of action for unfair competition
with slight modifications, or have combined it with other unfair trade method
legislation while allowing the common-law cause of action continued exist-
ence. Id. Other states have adopted the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act while retaining common-law avenues of protection. See, e.g., People v.
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Consequently, no uniformly recognized legal framework pro-
tects recording artists against others who seek to profit merely
by producing recordings substantially similar to the artist's
originals.8 6
This legal patchwork creates obstacles for recording artists.
The recording industry spans the country. In the case of a na-
tionally distributed commercial, as in Midler, the plaintiff may
be forced to bring suit in all fifty states to obtain full relief.
Moreover, the great diversity among the states' appioaches to
these doctrines gives a plaintiff's choice of forum too great a
role in the outcome of a suit.87
Not only are the state doctrines inconsistent, but the Copy-
right Act arguably preempts them. By stepping in to protect
against substantially similar reproductions of recording artists'
sound recordings, a state protects an element of the sound re-
cording that Congress deliberately chose to leave unprotected.8 "
Three circuits have decided, however, that preemption is not an
obstacle to a misappropriation claim.89 In Midler, for example,
Toomey, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1, 19-21, 203 Cal. Rptr. 642, 654-55 (1984) (using codi-
fied common law to enjoin misrepresentations in sales); Board of Trade of Chi-
cago v. Dow Jones & Co., 108 M. App. 3d 681, 696-97, 439 N.E.2d 526, 537 (App.
Ct. 1982) (adapting common-law doctrine of misappropriation to encompass
any form of "commercial immorality"), aff'd, 98 IlM. 2d 109, 456 N.E.2d 84
(1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, para. 311-317 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
86. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 10:31. Artists also may lose potential
financial remuneration through resulting market saturation. I.
87. See Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot. The Case for a Federal Stat-
ute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1987).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982); see also supra note 55 (quoting full text
of § 301(b)). Copyright law preempts state law when two requirements are
met: (1) the state right is "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106;" and (2) the right ex-
tends to "works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103." Id. One commentator wrote:
[P]laintiff's "property right" is often within the power of Congress to
protect by patent or copyright legislation, but Congress has not seen
fit to pass such protective legislation .... [S]ome courts will treat
plaintiff's "right" as no right at all, but as part of the public domain
which may be freely copied by all.... Other courts will regard Con-
gressional silence as an invitation to the courts to step in and remedy
the problem by using the common law misappropriation doctrine to
soften the harsh and sometimes unfair contours of patent and copy-
right protection.
1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 10:23.
89. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (dis-
missing argument that preemption precluded action for appropriation of
voice); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1106 (2d Cir.) (holding applica-
tion of state unfair competition laws to unpublished works protected by corn-
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although preemption doctrine precluded a cause of action for
misappropriation of a sound recording, the court allowed an ac-
tion for appropriation of identity.90 In contrast, a federal dis-
trict court decided recently that the Copyright Act preempted
an unfair competition claim based on California law because
the state law qualitatively duplicated copyright protection.9 '
Because these and other courts disagree on the scope of pre-
emption, recording artists cannot rely on state protections.
Amendment of the Copyright Act would create uniform federal
protection and ease this lingering doubt over the scope of
preemption.9 2
A further problem with the state-law doctrines is that
when they do provide protection for sound recordings, the pro-
tection is permanent. The Constitution, in contrast, specifically
provides for only a temporary monopoly on intellectual prop-
erty.93 Granting recording artists copyright protection against
substantially similar reproductions of their work would allow
these artists generous time in which to exploit commercially
their own recordings, until the works lapse into the public do-
main for the public benefit as Congress and the Constitution
intended.
In addition to concerns of inconsistency, preemption, and
the permanence of these protections, further criticisms9 4 apply
mon-law copyright preserved from preemption), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 785
n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding misappropriation claim not preempted
because not within scope of federal copyright law).
90. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64.
91. See Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp.
1236, 1239-40 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
92. For further discussion of the preemption issue, see H.R. REP. No. 94-
4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 128-29 (1969), cited in 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
supora note 24, § 1.01[B][1] nn.35 & 47; 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 35, § 4.63
(citing Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp.
37 (N.D. Tex. 1979)); Abrams, supra note 55, at 546; Note, suprm note 55, at
149-51; Note, supra note 56, at 152-56.
93, See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For works created on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1978, copyright begins at the creation the of work and lasts for the life of
the author or authors plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302 (a), (b) (1982). For
anonymous works and works made for hire, copyright lasts for 75 to 100 years.
Id § 302(b), (c); see also Note, supra note 56, at 161-62 (citing Lugosi v. Univer-
sal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 828, 603 P.2d 425, 434, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 333 (1979)
(Bird, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that federal copyright's duration of life plus
50 years be applied to right of publicity to avoid unlimited protection).
94. More criticisms occur than those discussed in the text, although they
perhaps are less subject to debate or even resolution. These criticisms include
that judges arguably lack the qualifications properly to weigh the competing
policies of individual property rights and society's needs. Another criticism at-
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to each doctrine. Unfair competition, for example, requires the
existence of actual competition between the parties before a
court can grant relief.95 This requirement creates an undue
hardship, because the imitated party rarely competes directly
with the imitator. In Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,96
a tire company simulated Nancy Sinatra's song.9 7 The imitation
arguably cut into Sinatra's market for selling her performances,
but the court rejected her unfair competition claim because she
failed to prove that her recording competed with the 'tire
company.9 8
Unfair competition theory also requires a showing of "pass-
ing off," a false implication to the public that the defendant's
work is that of the plaintiff.9 9 According to the FTC in In re
Magnetic Video Corp.,1 00 a company can defeat a claim of pass-
ing off and continue to sell simulated recordings so long as it
places a disclaimer on the album jacket.1 0 1 With the courts and
the FTC implicitly sanctioning such deceptive practices, record-
tacks the very basis of copyright, suggesting that a cause of action may be
based on the natural right of the artist to the fruits of his labor. Baird, surpra
note 57, at 417 (citing Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930)). Baird provides the counterargu-
meat that statutory provisions often are no more clear than judicial decisions,
and frequently merely codify common-law principles. Baird further suggests
that common law may be better suited to reform and improve the law incre-
mentally as such changes are needed. Id at 417-18.
95. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id; see also Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 349
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying Booth, an actress, protection under Lanham Act be-
cause she was not in competition with Colgate's products).
As one commentator wrote:
Artistic creativity is appropriate for federal statutory copyright, which
protects creativity per se, whether the defendant is a competitor or
not. Diligent application, however, is better suited to common law
misappropriation, which assesses the unfairness of the defendant's be-
havior in the light of the competitive relationship he has to the plain-
tiff, or at least in the light of the impact upon plaintiff's legitimate
expectations of business advantage accruing from his efforts.
I R. CALLMANN, supqra note 35, § 4.64, at 4-116.
99. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 714; Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F.
Supp. 1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969); 1 M. NIMIER & D. NEIMER, supra note 24,
§ 2.12 n.25; PRoSsER, supra note 36, § 130, at 1015-17.
100. 86 F.T.C. 1515, 1519 (1975); see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying
text.
101. 86 F.T.C. at 1520. The distributors also were enjoined from using any
likeness of the original artist or illustrations similar to those on the original
artist's album cover. Id.
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ing artists bear the heavy burden of showing actual consumer
deception. Copyright protection against substantially similar
imitations of a sound recording would require no showing of ac-
tual competition or passing off, but only a showing that a de-
fendant produced an unauthorized, substantially similar
reproduction. As a last resort, many commentators champion
the right of publicity as the cure for theft of performance style.
This right, however, does not adequately protect against the
simulation of the actual sound recordings; it extends protection
only to a publicly developed persona.10 2
A. CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION
State courts' willingness to protect recording artists against
substantially similar reproductions of their work demonstrates
the perceived need for such protection. The inadequacies of
state-law safeguards indicate the desirability of federal copy-
right protection.
The legislative history is unclear as to why Congress chose
to prohibit only the actual mechanical reproduction of sound
recordings, while extending copyright protection against sub-
stantially similar simulations to other artistic works. The rec-
ord conclusively shows only that, in drafting the sound
recording amendment, Congress sought the elimination of
widespread record piracy.10 3
102. Felcher and Rubin, supra note 61, at 1625. In addition, the extension
of such a continuing right poses practical difficulties in limiting such a right;
and with its ephemeral, personal nature, the extension of protection may be
inappropriate. Copyright expires automatically 50 years after the author's
death, and the right attaches to works fixed in tangible media-not to the
ephemeral persona.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5674; see also Mowrey, The Rise and Fall of
Record Piracy, 27 COPYRIGHT L. Symp. (ASCAP) 155, 179 (1982) (noting that
United States Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce urged legislation
to outlaw record piracy). Outlawing the mechanical reproduction of sound re-
cordings achieved this goal, but went no further.
Before 1971, federal copyright in musical works protected only the musi-
cal score, and not the recording itself. Unauthorized use included any use of a
copyrighted work that conflicted with any of the owner's exclusive rights, such
as the right of reproduction, distribution, or performance. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982). The terms reproduction and copy are distinguished in this Note in ac-
cordance with usage in the Copyright Act, which defines copies as "material
objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated." Id. § 101 (emphasis added). Conse-
quently, unauthorized reproduction of records and tapes became an
enormously successful industry. Congress cited authority as estimating the
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Section 114 of the Act prohibits record piracy by banning
actual reproduction of a sound recording. 0 4 Congress could
have eliminated record piracy without section 114 simply by al-
lowing the section 106 rights applicable to other kinds of copy-
rightable works to apply to sound recordings as well. Section
106 prohibits unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works
other than sound recordings. 05 A substantially similar, unau-
thorized reprodluction violates this exclusive right of reproduc-
tion.1 06 If section 106 governed reproduction of sound
recordings, they too would be judged by the substantial similar-
ity standard; a pirate copy would be substantially similar to an
original and therefore prohibited. 0 7
Congress's decision to subject sound recordings to the "ac-
tual reproduction" standard of infringement under section 114
could have stemmed from a desire to encourage multiple rendi-
tions of a musical composition, thereby generating royalties for
the song's writer.'0  The "actual reproduction" requirement
encourages multiple renditions by freeing those making later
piracy industry's sales at more than $100 million annually, approximately one-
fourth of all sound recording sales. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnDIN. NEWS 1566, 1567. State common-
law and anti-piracy statutes afforded only limited and inadequate protection.
Congress responded in 1971 with a restricted copyright for sound recordings,
and revised the statute further in the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1982).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
105. Id § 106; see also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (setting forth
§ 106 rights).
106. See infra notes 117-20 and acdompanying text.
107. In addition to eliminating piracy, a substantial similarity test also
would prohibit reproduction through independent fixation, arguably prohibit-
ing the simulation involved in cases like Midler and Magnetic Video. See
supra notes 45-49, 59-64 and accompanying text.
108. See generally H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 66, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMin. NEws 5659, 5679 (discussing policies for and
against compulsory licensing of musical compositions); see also Note, supra
note 79, at 1733 (discussing whether sound sampling should be considered dub-
bing).
Congress also manifested a desire to encourage multiple renditions of a
song by subjecting all copyrighted musical compositions to a compulsory li-
censing scheme. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982). This provision allowed the Ford
Company automatically to obtain the rights to make its own rendition of Mid-
ler's song by paying a fee. The "actual reproduction" rule then' allowed Ford
to record its near-perfect imitation of Midler's previous rendition. Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
Congress's goal thus arguably would be defeated by limiting the number
of subsequent renditions to those that could be recorded in a manner suffi-
ciently different from the original to avoid liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)
(assigning exclusive rights of copyright according to subject matter); Note,
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recordings from onerous fears of infringement. This reasoning,
however, ignores the importance of the performer's artistically
expressive role in recording, 0 9 implicitly placing it lower in the
hierarchy of public merit than works of the fine artist or au-
thor. The painter's brush thus becomes a worthier tool than
the singer's voice; the author's rendition of a folk story more
valuable than a pianist's interpretation of Mozart.
By rewarding only the composer of the song, and not the
recording artist, the Copyright Act suggests that all musical
creativity originates with the composer's sheet music.110 The
recording artist, then, is viewed as a machine that reads the
music and mechanically "transforms the music back to aural
form, like a player piano reading a piano roll. This suggestion
errs in differing degrees according to the situation. Each of two
symphony orchestras recording a Beethoven symphony infuses
its own creativity; each plays the same written notes, but ap-
proaches the score differently. Yet while the musicians infuse
creativity, perhaps the lion's share of the creativity for this type
of work lies with Beethoven.
In the base of improvisational music such as jazz, electronic
music, and popular music, in contrast, a written score only min-
imally describes those elements of a song that make it popular.
With these kinds of works, a new improvisational idea or style,
an electronic sound, or an unusual vocal delivery often forms
the basis for a song's success. A competing recording artist who
supra note 79, at 1733 (concluding that market for particular song once re-
corded might decline).
Other commentators raise first amendment concernx regarding further
expansion of the rights to sound recordings. This concern is directed primarily
at proposed legislative protection of an exclusive performance right. See Note,
State "Copyright" Protection for Performers: The First Amendment Question,
1978 DUKE L.J. 1198, 1221 (1978).
109. In Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631
(1937), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged this role by noting that
the performer recasts the musical composition into a sound recording. Be-
cause of this creative and intellectual contribution, the performer gains an in-
tellectual property right in the performance. I& at 440-41, 194 A. at 635; cf.
Lang, Performance and the Right of the Performing Artist, 21 COPYRIGHT L.
SymP. (ASCAP) 69 (1974) (arguing that copyright for performer's style cannot
be analogized to copyright for art). According to Lang, however, if style is pro-
tected "Picasso might then -have sole use of 'synthetic Cubism'--or must he
share the style with Braque, Max Jacob ... and the others who.., were re-
sponsible for the formation of Cubism?" Id at 95. Lang stretched the analogy
by contending that protection of a sound recording amounts to protection of
the song style itself. See Note, supra note 11, at 567 (criticizing Lang's
argument).
110. See .supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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buys a license to use a written score of such a song has not
bought what is most valuable about the song. For the minimal
fee with which they buy the score, competing artists receive li-
cense to imitate those elements of style and sound that have
made the song valuable.
The failure to protect the recording artist's contribution to
a sound recording, then, presents disincentives to creativity?-"
By simulating a sound recording for commercial advantage, the
appropriator receives the benefit of the original sound record-
ing's investment of time, creativity, and financial outlay; the
original performer and producer, the "cfeators," get nothing.
In addition, the prospect of litigating rights in multiple jurisdic-
tions increases the cost of seeking judicial protection." 2 Be-
cause the framers of copyright law sought to induce creative
work for the public good through guarantees of ownership and
financial remuneration for the creator, 13 the law must protect
the rights of those responsible for creating a commercially suc-
cessful recording?' 4 Economic harm also occurs when the ap-
1. That such imitation can cause the original artist to lose potential com-
pensation is illustrated by such cases as Midler, 849 F.2d at 463, and Lombardo
v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Ina, 58 A.D.2d 620, 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664
(App. Div. 1977). See also Note, suipra note 87, at 1193 (discussing similar fi-
nancially-oriented policy concerns regarding right of publicity statutes).
112. Beyond mere economic harm, creativity is discouraged when the per-
former "is denied the right to choose when, how, and under what circum-
stances his creative expression style is used." Note, supora note 11, at 593. As
seen in cases such as Midler, 849 F.2d at 464, and Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971),
in which the simulated sounds were used for advertising, the performer's op-
portunities for future commercial endorsement considerably decrease. The ad-
vertiser gets the benefit of the original performer at less cost so long as the
advertiser may simulate recordings without fear of sanction.
113. See supra notes 1416 and accompanying text.
114. Non-economic concerns also support fuller protection for sound re-
cordings. Although the 1976 Copyright Act moved toward alignment with for-
eign copyright protections, the United States still refuses to grant "moral
rights" to creators. See Abelman & Berkowitz, International Copyright Law,
22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 619, 645-52 (1977) (proviling summary of past and pres-
ent state of international copyright protections). Such moral rights safeguard
the artist's reputation. HENN, COPYRIGHT LAw: A PRAcnToNERs'S GUIDE 176
(2d ed. 1988). They also include the right to be known as the author and to
prevent others from using a work in such a manner as to reflect on the au-
thor's professional reputation. IT; see Treece, American Law Analogies of the
Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. Comp. L. 487, 494 (1968); Note, The Doctrine
of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HAnv.
L. REv. 553, 558-74 (1940). Moreover, moral rights include the right to object
to "distortion, mutilation, or other alteration" of a creative work. Abelman &
Berkowitz, supra, at 629.
Foreign laws generally accord greater significance to the artist's rights
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propriator usurps the original artist's commercial advantage,
interfering with the artist's potential economic return. The im-
itator injures the original artist's earning potential by preclud-
ing certain commercial endorsements, by overexposing the
product and the original artist, by associating the artist with an
inferior product, and by interfering with the artist's "right to
enjoy the fruits of his own industry.""15
III. CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The sound recording, classified as a derivative work of the
underlying musical composition, should receive federal copy-
right protection against simulation through independent fixa-
tion.1 16 To achieve this result, section 114(b) of the Copyright
than do those of the United States. Baird, supra note 57, at 416. For instance,
under French law, the artist's name must be associated with his work when-
ever it is published or displayed. Id; cf. Sarraute, Current Theory on the
Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L.
465, 478-80 (1968) (explaining that this right is justified out of respect for art-
ist's labors, not on economic incentive theory). Moreover, the laws of many
foreign countries provide protection for the performer in particular recorded
renditions and for the record producer in sound recordings per se. COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL RE-
VISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (House Commit-
tee Print 1961).
115. Note, supra note 55, at 147 (citing Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.
Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970)); see also Halpern, supra note 78, at 1239 (not-
ing potential for great economic harm in appropriation of another's creation).
This type of economic harm occurred in Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d
256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962), in which the court found the plaintiff's market satu-
rated by the defendant's actions. Such situations also give rise to consumer de-
ception claims, as seen in Midler, 849 F.2d at 461-63 (claiming audience
deception), Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712 (claiming consumer deception due to simu-
lation of sound recording), and In re Magnetic Video Corp., 86 F.T.C. 1515,
1519 (1975) (alleging that consumers confused sound-alikes with recordings by
the original artist).
116. See 2 M. NImMER & D. NInsER, supra note 24, § 8.01[G], at 8-21. A
work allegedly infringing on an article fully protected by copyright is actiona-
ble whether it is a "facimile [sic] reproduction, or is otherwise 'duplicated,
transcribed, imitated, or simulated."' Id (quoting H. REP. No. 83, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 5659,
5674). Further support for the separate copyright of a particular rendition of a
musical work, and hence the applicability of the substantial similarity test, ap-
pears in Performance Royalty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1975).
As William Cannon stated: "There are many factors in the total pop-
ularity of a record, and the song itself is many times of minor impor-
tance. The most important factors . . . are the artist (singer,
instrumentalist, or group) ... ; the song or tune, but never in its origi-
nal state; the arranger... ; the engineers ... ; and the very important
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Act should be repealed, making sound recordings subject to the
same standards as other artistic works. In the absence of direct
proof of intentional and successful simulation, courts would de-
termine copyright infringement by the "substantial similar-
ity"un7 of a defendant's work and proof of the defendant's access
to the original work."28 A plaintiff would have to prove either
that the defendant actually copied the first work," 9 or that the
defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and that the two
works were substantially similar. The degree of similarity
courts should require for actionable infringement of a sound re-
cording would depend on the type of work and the degree to
which the recording artist, rather than the composer, was the
primary creative source. 2 0 For example, a jazz improvisation
would be infringed, assuming proof of access, by a recording
fairly close to the original. In contrast, a classical orchestral
work would not be infringed without virtually exact duplica-
tion. This continuum thus properly protects recordings of those
works subject to multitudinous expression as well as those hav-
ing narrower potential for expression, and corresponds with the
application of that test in other media.12' Expert testimony and
area of exposure and promotion to the public." The highly talented
jazz musician's original interpretation of a musical composition is
often far removed from the original tune set down in lines of notes of
the copyrighted work. In classical music, too, there can be considera-
ble variation in the interpretation of a piece.
The Director of the Boston Syphony Orchestra stated: "[i]f the performer
and the artists were not important, then one recording of Beethoven's Ninth
would be sufficient for everyone for all time. Why bother with a second inter-
pretation if it can be no different than the first?" Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on The
Judiciar, U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 821 (1967) (statement of Erich
Leinsdorf, then-Musical Director of the Boston Symphony Orchestra).
117. One court defined the required level of similarity as similar enough to
be "recognizable as the same performance" as that of the plaintiff. United
States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part vacated
in ar4, 540 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
118. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Note, supra note 79, at 1731.
119. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162.
120. One commentator surmised that a major obstacle to protection under
common-law theories has been the difficulty of defining style. Note, supra
note 55, at 139; see generally Note, supra note 11, at 593 (advocating protec-
tions for creations of style). This problem becomes moot, however, when style
is viewed not as an independent principle but as synonymous with the sound
recording itself. By preventing unauthorized simulation of the entire work,
the performer obtains protection for style, but only within the context of the
particular sound recording.
121. In the literary field, for example, a strict standard of similarity is used
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jury determination would fulfill fact-finding roles.122
Changing the actual reproduction rule to the substantial
similarity threshold for infringement shifts the existing policy
balance between protecting performers and encouraging multi-
ple renditions more in favor of the former than under the cur-
rent Copyright Act. This shift in the balance struck by
Congress is justified by the need to eliminate the unfair ex-
ploitation and creative discouragement that the current balance
imposes on recording artists.
CONCLUSION
Performers and producers demand protection for their cre-
ative efforts in a sound recording. State-law doctrines provide
some relief, but their attempts to protect such artists' contribu-
tions are incomplete and unreliable. Moreover, extreme varia-
bility among jurisdictions and persistent debate as to federal
preemption of state safeguards underscore the inadequacies of
existing law.
The performer's interpretation of a musical composition
plays a major role in the recording, which is a unique product
of the performer's talents, energy, time, effort, and expense.123
to test fictional works subject to expansive articulation, as compared with the
more lenient test applied to historical accounts with limited interpretational
potential. One court wrote:
One consequence of the policy in favor of free use of ideas is that the
degree of substantial similarity required to show infringement varies
according to the type of work and the ideas expressed in it. Some
ideas can be expressed in myriad ways, while others allow only a nar-
row range of expression.
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (citation omitted) (delineating limits of
infringement test for nonfiction literary works). The copyright owner of a re-
cording of a Mozart string quartet thus would have to prove the virtual iden-
tity of a second recording, and that defendant did not arrive at the expression
independently, to obtain relief.
There is little merit to the argument that more exacting styles of music
would not be infringed under this standard. If every recording were exactly
the same as the previous, there would be no reason for continued recording.
As Learned Hand wrote, "[t]he performer has a wide choice, depending upon
his gifts, and this makes his rendition pro tanto quite as original a 'composi-
tion' as an 'arrangement' or 'adaptation' of the score itself." Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dis-
senting). Few orchestral conductors would agree that their contributions to
interpretation are merely trivial.
122. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
123. One prominent copyright expert described the so-called "free-rider"
problem as follows:
If the product or service is one that requires substantial investment,
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Yet the Copyright Act fails to protect this creative element of
recorded music without any redeeming reason. The Act distin-
guishes sound recording reproduction from the reproduction of
art, literature, and other copyrighted works. 124 With the excep-
tion of sound recordings, the right of reproduction is infringed
through duplication of a work by simulation. 2 5 This disparate
treatment results in the inequitable denial of relief to original
artists. The mechanical reproduction of a sound recording has
the same potential effect on both performers and audiences as
does a conscientious simulation, yet the two are treated differ-
ently. Congress should correct this anomaly of the Copyright
Act by eliminating the infringement exemption in section 114
for independent fixations,2 6 resulting in the application of the
whether of capital or talent, the investment may not be made if the
prospect of profit, cloudy at best, is made more risky by the likelihood
that competitors will enter, drive prices down to their marginal costs,
and leave the originator with no return on her sunk costs, and with
no hope of profits that will balance the risk of failure.
Brown, Copyright and its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, and Unfair
Competition: the Sixteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 J. CoPY-
RIGHT Soc'y 301, 314 (1986).
124. See 2 M. NnIMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.01[c] (distinguishing
between copying from artist's work and from common source). Justice
Holmes commented on this principle in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903): "The opposite proposition would mean that a portrait
by Velasquez or Whistler was common property because others might try their
hand on the same face. Others are free to copy the original. They are not free
to copy the copy." Id. at 249.
Holmes's statement does not stand for the proposition that only reproduc-
tions fall under copyright protection while the original does not, but refers to
the original subject matter. Applying this argument to sound recordings, one
could make an authorized derivative work of a musical composition, but could
not make a purposeful imitation of another derivative work of the same com-
position. 2 M. NIDMER & D. NamER, supra note 24, § 8.01[c], at 8-16.
125. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS 5659, 5674. The House Report further states that
imitation of a recording is not a copyright infringement, even when intention-
ally performed exactly as the original was. Id. at 106.
126. The constitutionality of such an amendment poses no difficulty, be-
cause the courts already have disposed of this issue. Works produced by
"sound recording firms ... satisfy the requirements of authorship found in the
copyright clause." Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972)
(per curiam); see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (constru-
ing writings of authors as any "fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor"
by any originator); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d
657, 660 (2d Cir. 1955) ('"There can be no doubt that, under the Constitution,
Congress could give ... the exclusive right to make and vend phonograph
records of that rendition."). But cf. Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright"
The Capitol Records Case, 69 HARv. L. REv. 409, 413 (1956) (noting argument
that musical rendition may not be copyrighted because performer is not an au-
thor (citing Hearings Before Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-marks, and Copy-
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substantial similarity test to alleged infringers. Artists like
Bette Midler, Nancy Sinatra, and Artie Shaw then would have
the opportunity to argue that the simulators misappropriated
their original contribution, a contribution worthy of protection
under the Copyright Act.
Linda Benjamin
rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R 1269, 1270, and 2570, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, at 26, 34-38, 232, 267, 269, 277 (1947))).
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